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Talking past each other: 
Regional and domestic 
resistance in the Burundian 
intervention scene
Stefanie Wodrig and Julia Grauvogel
Abstract
Peacebuilding attempts invoke a considerable amount of friction. In this article we argue that 
these frictional encounters can be made visible by focusing on articulations of resistance voiced 
by different actors in the intervention scene, including national elites and interveners. Departing 
from the discussion of the regionally led facilitation in Burundi, we show that the respective 
national elites and African interveners referred to different scales in order to legitimise their 
resistance: the Great Lakes Peace Initiative for Burundi resisted sedimented continental practices 
as well as international attempts to impose their conceptions of peace, whereas the Burundian 
elites repeatedly rejected regionally sponsored ‘solutions’ with reference to the domestic situation. 
Drawing on interviews with and statements by diverse national and regional forces, we show how 
claims to resist were articulated with respect to different spatial reference points and thereby 
explore how regional and domestic actors talked past each other.
Keywords
Burundi, friction, peacebuilding, resistance
Introduction
Peacebuilding is characterised by encounters between multiple external and domestic 
forces with different and often conflicting ideas about the intervention and the post-crisis 
order. In the previous decade studies on this subject matter tended to make sense of the 
complexity of an intervention by focusing on the liberal peace as the hegemonic external 
leitmotiv. Lately, they have concentrated on the hybrid peace as the actual manifestation 
in the post-crisis context. In contrast, we approach the complexity of an intervention in 
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general and the Burundian peace process in particular by focusing on how a group of 
regional forces organised in the Great Lakes Peace Initiative for Burundi (henceforth, 
Regional Initiative) interacted with Burundian national elites. In doing so, we follow the 
academic trend of abandoning the liberal peace as a framework for analysis (Heathershaw, 
2013: 276; Zaum, 2012: 122) without, however, entirely shifting our focus to the micro-
dynamics of peace at the local scale (cf. Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Even though 
we recognise the importance of a locally owned peace being sustainable (Autesserre, 
2009), the encounters between regional interveners and domestic elites also constitute a 
crucial site of knowledge production in the intervention scene, which is often underap-
preciated in today’s sociology of intervention.
The case of Burundi is particularly insightful because, on the one hand, the domestic 
elites were not simply co-opted by the interveners and their statebuilding efforts but 
rather actively renegotiated, reinterpreted and subverted institutions and practices pro-
moted by the interveners (Curtis, 2013: 84). On the other hand, instead of a Western-
dominated so-called international community, the intervention politics were mainly 
crafted and carried out by neighbouring states that, while intervening, outlined a new 
identity for themselves as agents that are able to shape their own futures (Wodrig, 2014). 
Both regional and domestic forces laid claim to actively shaping the Burundian crisis 
context, thereby rendering friction almost inevitable.
In a nutshell, we specifically address the encounters between regional forces and 
national elites in the Burundian intervention scene.1 This perspective paints a more 
nuanced picture of regional interveners, which were either neglected or depicted as con-
forming to international peacebuilding templates in previous research, and national elites 
often accused of being co-opted by the international community, as we argue in more 
detail below. Most importantly, the article highlights the frictional nature of these other-
wise understudied encounters. Thus, intervention in the Burundian crisis constituted an 
essentially political endeavour, during which different interpretations of the crisis as well 
as different conceptions of peace and order coexisted against the backdrop of competing 
claims to power, both on the national and the regional scale. In this article we argue that 
such ‘friction’ (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Tsing, 2005) can be made intelligible by 
focusing on the articulations of resistance2 voiced by the domestic elite and regional 
interveners on how to build peace, with respect to the conception of the others. Based on 
the insight that domination is only discernible when it is questioned and resisted (Daase 
and Deitelhoff, 2014: 1), analysing articulations of resistance during the Burundian con-
flict renders visible entangled relations of domination between the different actors. Such 
a perspective on the Burundian intervention highlights the co-constitution of domination 
and resistance and calls into question the one-sided but widely accepted perspective on 
the localisation of domination and resistance, which objectivises not only domestic elites 
but also interveners as forces of domination aiming to enforce preset understandings of 
liberal peace.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: based on the notion of interven-
tion as a political process, we first discuss why and how analysing articulations of resist-
ance helps to unravel the frictional encounters between domestic elites and regional 
interveners. Drawing on several months of field research in Burundi and Tanzania,3 we 
then explore how these two groups articulated their practices as resistance while 
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simultaneously seeking to dominate the process of establishing a post-war order for 
Burundi and how these actors talked past each other when articulating their resistance 
with respect to different scales. Scrutinising these self-referential articulations of resist-
ance helps to disclose the fragile nature of establishing a post-conflict order in a case that 
has long been considered a success story, as we will show in the last section.
Theorising resistance in the intervention scene
For many years, Burundi has been considered an example of a successful externally medi-
ated transition to peace, where the Regional Initiative and the wider international commu-
nity assisted institutional engineering to address the conflict’s roots, including the uneven 
distribution of wealth and opportunity along ethnic and geographic lines (Ndikumana, 
2005). As in many contemporary cases of peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions, 
the interveners sought to establish peace through constructing or ‘improving’ formal state 
institutions. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 and the subsequent 
constitutional reform put in place a power-sharing agreement that comes close to an ideal 
typical consociational model (Reyntjens, 2006; Vandeginste, 2009).
Intervention as a frictional process
In contrast to this (implicit) conceptualisation of international intervention, which 
focuses on the suitability of particular institutions to bring peace, we analyse interven-
tions into a crisis as an essentially political process, in the course of which the numerous 
encounters between interveners and domestic elites as well as ordinary citizens are never 
without friction (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Tsing, 2005). Due to the complexity of 
intervention processes, institutional and social change should be conceived of as a non-
linear undertaking that is difficult to steer (Chandler, 2013: 18–22; Körppen and Ropers, 
2011). The analysis of the complex interactions in the intervention scene is central to 
enhancing our understanding of the context-specific possibilities of crafting a peace and 
institutional change that is acceptable to both implementers and intended beneficiaries 
(Autesserre, 2014: 8–10).
We understand friction as a conceptual metaphor (Tsing, 2005: 5) that structures our 
analysis of the intervention scene. In contrast to the concept of hybrid peace, which pri-
marily points to the outcome of global-local encounters in the intervention scene, friction 
highlights the process (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Millar et al., 2013: 139). Friction 
should be understood as an interaction across difference (Tsing, 2005: 4); it points to 
various moments in which different forces, ideas and practices collide with each other, 
thereby frustrating any linear understanding of peace- and statebuilding. Having said 
this, the notion of friction defies any neat conceptualisation (Björkdahl and Höglund, 
2013: 292) and may even remain unnoticed (Freire and Lopes, 2013). As a response, we 
suggest that frictional encounters can be made intelligible by retrieving intertwined artic-
ulations of domination and resistance (see also Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013: 292). This 
focus on domination and resistance captures the very essence of the concept of friction, 
which ‘reminds us that heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrange-
ments of [...] power’ (Tsing, 2005: 5). At the same time, this understanding of friction 
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captures the sometimes unexpected and contradictory ways in which local as well as 
international forces (and regional ones, as we would add) resist pre-defined solutions to 
the crisis context (Hughes, 2013). Such a notion of peacebuilding as a frictional process 
highlights, firstly, that the various heterogeneous interveners by no means agree upon 
how to interpret the crisis or, on this basis, which solution to push for (Campbell, 2008; 
Heathershaw, 2008). In Burundi, a variety of external forces, including a regional ad hoc 
merger as well as international agencies such as the United Nations (UN) and non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs), struggled to define peace (Daley, 2007: 334). Among 
them, the Regional Initiative emerged as an early example of the growing importance of 
regionally led peace processes (Crocker et al., 2014). Such regional interveners do not 
simply conform to a universalised template of what peace should look like (Chandler, 
2009: 22; Mac Ginty, 2008: 143).
Secondly, our analytical focus also shows that we do not conceive of the crisis context 
as an ‘empty shell’, where the interveners, based on a linear understanding of peace pro-
cesses, are assumed to construct a new political order from scratch, hence ignoring the 
existing political and social structures (Lemay-Hébert, 2011b). Instead, the intervention 
scene is not only shaped by the divergent visions of peace and order held by external 
actors, but also by the conflicting interpretations of those forces located in the crisis 
context. Against this backdrop, interveners cannot ‘just’ select and install the ‘right’ 
elites to become political leaders (Manning, 2006: 724), because being ‘chosen’ might 
negatively affect the latter’s domestic legitimacy (Goodhand and Walton, 2009: 315). 
Based on these deliberations, we analyse the intervention in Burundi as a political pro-
cess in which regional forces struggled to define peace for the small Great Lakes country 
– a place where domestic elites and armed movements were themselves in conflict over 
the future of the state. By unravelling the frictional encounters between domestic and 
regional forces, we expand on previous applications of friction in the critical peacebuild-
ing literature, which primarily look at the interplay of international and local forces, 
ideas and practices (inter alia Freire and Lopes, 2013; Van der Lijn, 2013).
The analytic focus on domestic and regional elites as the main protagonists within the 
Burundian intervention scene is unquestionably a simplified depiction. Just as Western 
and non-Western forces cannot be easily separated, neither can domestic elites and 
regional interveners, as actors and their ideas and practices often transcend such localisa-
tions (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013). Yet, at the same time, the (geographic) proximity 
to or distance from the crisis context suggests certain kinds of politics towards the inter-
vention scene and excludes others (Visoka, 2012).
In Burundi, this locatedness can be illustrated by the coup d’état in the summer of 
1996. The Burundian army reinstalled the former Burundian president, Pierre Buyoya, 
who belonged to the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA (Union for National Progress). This 
event in the Burundian capital Bujumbura shaped the intervention scene for years. In 
response, the Regional Initiative decided to impose comprehensive sanctions on the 
Buyoya regime in the northern Tanzanian town of Arusha. These regional sanctions 
remained in place until early 1999 and shaped not just the daily life of the local popula-
tion in the Burundian hills, but also led to the setting up of a policy forum in Washington 
DC, where US government, UN and NGO staff exchanged views on the peace process 
and regional sanctions. Thus, the meanings given to the crisis and the solutions proposed 
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are a result of parallel discourses that, although related to each other, unfolded in differ-
ent localities.
Theorising entanglements of resistance and domination
We argue that it is possible to conceptualise the frictional encounters between the regional 
interveners and domestic elites as a form of resistance to their counterparts’ politics of 
change. In this section, we explicate our take on resistance before embedding it into the 
wider discussion on resistance in the intervention scene in the next section. Despite the 
plurality of approaches through which resistance is studied (Weitz, 2001: 669), it is pos-
sible to identify at least two widely accepted elements: firstly, resistance refers to a sense 
of action in the broadest possible sense, ranging from non-participating (Mac Ginty, 
2012) to questioning to objecting (Modigliani and Rochat, 1995: 112) to obstructing 
(Visoka, 2011). Secondly, resistance is founded on a sense of opposition (Hollander and 
Einwohner, 2004). Based on these elements, we consider regional interveners’ and 
domestic elites’ claims to oppose the domination of the respective other as resistance, 
regardless of whether the other recognised it as such.4
Domination and resistance are intimately intertwined. Following Sharp et al. (2002), 
this implies that actors may voice or enact resistance and domination simultaneously. 
Rather than conceiving of resistance as being outside of power, domination and hegem-
ony, it becomes necessary to understand the entanglements of power and resistance. 
There are multiple systems of hierarchy, and actors can be simultaneously powerful and 
powerless, dominating and resisting, within different systems (Ashcraft, 2005). Our take 
on resistance does not strip the concept of its analytical power. Instead, it highlights that 
those resisting, especially the less marginalised, cannot free themselves from their power 
to shape ideas, practices and subjects, thereby creating new forms of domination. Hence, 
we avoid the problematic tendency of most studies of resistance, which ‘begin by divid-
ing the population into the powerful and the powerless’ (Miller, 1997: 32).
Neither those resisting nor those dominating are monolithic groups free of contradic-
tions (Ortner, 1995), so ‘exercising power, as everyone does to varying degrees, cannot 
preclude one from also acting as an agent of resistance in relation to some other power’ 
(Jermier et al., 1994: 16). Those individuals or groups resisting may simultaneously sup-
port structures of domination that sparked resistance in the first place. Thus, we agree with 
Nadarajah and Rampton (2015: 69) that there are no autonomous spaces of indigeneity 
and authenticity from which resistance emerges or wherein it can exclusively take place. 
Based on these insights from resistance studies, we argue that analysing the articulations 
of resistance of the domestic elites and regional interveners helps to uncover friction in the 
intervention scene, since domination becomes most clearly discernible when it is ques-
tioned and resisted (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2014: 1). But how can resistance be identified 
if it is no longer conceptualised as a quality of subordinate actors? Following others who 
are sceptical about the idea that researchers can recognise ‘proper’ resistance, and insights 
about the difficulty to assess the actors’ true intention to resist, as this would require 
access to their internal state of mind (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004), we focus on their 
claims to resist. By exploring the construction of such articulations of resistance, we also 
refute a distinction between linguistic and physical resistance.
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Resistance beyond the non-state local
Such a conceptual take on the entanglements of resistance and domination allows us to 
move beyond power/resistance and international/local binaries that still persist in the lit-
erature on resistance and friction in the intervention scene. To deconstruct the dominant 
peacebuilding approach that has focused on institutional change on the national scale 
(Autesserre, 2009), scholarship began to highlight the different perspectives on peace held 
by the ordinary people and how this clashed with external visions of order (for Burundi, 
see Uvin, 2009). Scholars examined how resistance vis-à-vis liberal peacebuilding led to 
hybrid forms of peace, yet attributed articulations of resistance mostly to those local 
forces that operate outside the state (Richmond, 2011: 430) – for example, locally based 
civil society organisations and networks based on kith and kin (De Heredia, 2012). Such 
an interpretation of resistance in the intervention scene reifies a power/resistance binary 
(Chandler, 2013: 31) and, as a result, cultural differences by reinforcing the impression 
that local, non-liberal subjects resist interveners who tend to advocate a variant of liberal 
peace (Sabaratnam, 2013: 266–268). This is not to deny that certain individuals, commu-
nities or organisations are privileged to exercise domination or, likewise, resistance. For 
example, certain elites have a clear advantage in that they can ‘talk the talk’ of interna-
tional peacebuilding (Heathershaw, 2010). Not all domestic forces possess the capabilities 
required to critically engage with interveners (Hughes, 2013; Peterson, 2012).
Resistance in such a context is by no means inherently emancipatory (cf. Nadarajah 
and Rampton, 2015). Based on such a descriptive rather than prescriptive understanding 
of resistance (Millar, 2014), we contend that it is crucial to examine emancipatory, exclu-
sionary (Visoka, 2011), illiberal and even oppressive (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 
2010) forms of resistance and their entanglements with domination. Parts of the national 
political elite may not only exploit loopholes created by liberal peacebuilding for their 
own interests (Richmond and Mitchell, 2011), but they may also create different versions 
of peace and order (Öjendal and Ou, 2013). Hence, one cannot escape the inevitable 
irony and ambiguity stemming from the entanglements of resistance and domination by 
focusing on forms of resistance that appear to be – with respect to the social and political 
position of those resisting – further removed from the exercise of power. Understanding 
resistance as being inseparably intertwined with the exercise of domination justifies con-
ceptualisations of intervention in a crisis (and, potentially, subsequent attempts to build 
peace) as frictional encounters that comprise the ‘potential for both empowerment and 
disempowerment’ (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013: 294). Consequently, this notion of 
resistance in the crisis context allows scholars to overcome unhelpful binaries and exam-
ine complex processes of negotiating post-war orders that emerge out of the co-constitu-
tion of domination and resistance.
Domination and resistance in the case of Burundi
Even though regional intervention politics in Burundi continued beyond 2000, our analy-
sis focuses on the period from 1996 to 2000, which was particularly characterised by the 
domestic political elite’s investment in resistance strategies vis-à-vis regional peacemak-
ing attempts (Havermans, 2000) and vice versa.5 During this time, domestic elites and 
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regional interveners recurrently articulated their policies as acts of resistance and, as we 
will show, thereby sought to strengthen their position in the intervention scene. These 
frictional encounters were especially pronounced with respect to regional plans to dis-
patch a military force, the enactment of sanctions and regional insistence on owning the 
peace process, as we will demonstrate in the following.
Tabula rasa of a military option
After an initial peacemaking initiative by the UN and the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) failed to curtail the violence in Burundi, the neighbouring governments of 
Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire created the Regional Initiative for Burundi in 
1995, of which former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere was designated as chief facili-
tator. With the memories of the 1994 Rwandese genocide still fresh, the Regional 
Initiative (1996a) decided to tackle the increased instability in Burundi by dispatching its 
members’ militaries in June 1996 and subsequently began preparing for the humanitarian 
intervention.
The Burundian elite, however, resisted this regional plan of interference so vigorously 
that the regional preparatory mission had to be cancelled (Khadiagala, 2003: 226). The 
ruling elites’ fear that the mission would threaten their control over the Burundian military 
(Brachet and Wolpe, 2005) led them to consider a coup d’état to be the only means by 
which to prevent potential regional military involvement (Hyera, 2004: 58). Yet, criticism 
of regional interference was not limited to the army and long-ruling elements of the Tutsi 
minority. The Hutu armed movements CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL also opposed the 
regional plans, arguing that a regional military intervention would undermine what they 
considered to be a justified struggle against Tutsi domination (Omach, 2000).
Both radical Tutsis and Hutus hence rejected the proposed military mission, not least 
because each group still believed that winning the civil conflict was a viable option. 
Following a compromise negotiated in 1994, the Hutu presidency and Tutsi military 
operated under a power-sharing arrangement (Nsanze, 2003), which both sides hoped to 
exploit to their advantage to gain control over the political process (interview with S 
Ntibantunganya, President of the Republic of Burundi from 1994 to 1996). Against this 
backdrop, the radical Tutsi and Hutu elites’ positions on the regionally led military inter-
vention can be considered a way of sustaining their domestic domination through resist-
ing a regional response.
Pushing for a humanitarian intervention
In contrast to the Burundian elites who resisted regional plans to militarily intervene on 
the grounds that it would put the Regional Initiative in a strong position to radically alter 
the domestic power constellation, the members of the Regional Initiative generally 
viewed the strategy as a way of preventing ‘a second Rwanda’ (Ould-Abdallah, 2000: 
67). Drawing on the ‘false twins’ narrative, which represents Rwanda’s and Burundi’s 
inversed domestic history of domination by and subordination of Hutus and Tutsis 
(Museveni, 1998; Regional Initiative, 1995), the Regional Initiative sought to guard ‘the 
people from the agony and suffering that had befallen their neighbours in Rwanda’ 
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(Butiku, 2004: 65). This analogy between Rwanda and Burundi was invoked to legiti-
mise military involvement in the conflict. The OAU (1996) argued that such a humani-
tarian intervention constituted ‘a fraternal and genuine concern to prevent yet another 
African tragedy’ rather than unjustified interference in internal affairs. The Regional 
Initiative’s ‘never again’ stance articulated its resistance to the region’s past inaction and 
the then still dominant norm of non-interference.
Since the plan for humanitarian intervention collapsed, the Regional Initiative did not 
consolidate its domination in the intervention scene by force. However, the episode 
helped to unite the regional elites in aspiring to be a certain type of intervener. When the 
coup d’état of July 1996 occurred, the Regional Initiative (1996b) was quick to call 
‘upon all the parties in conflict to abide’ by the regional decisions; this indicated that the 
Regional Initiative had firmly established a paternalistic attitude common to interveners, 
which imagines the respective elites in the crisis context as lacking the aptitude for mak-
ing responsible choices (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2005: 301). Thus, with the emer-
gence of ‘never again’ as a shared rationale among the regional interveners, arguments 
like ‘who should help if not us’ (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012: 1) came to be normalised 
and, hence, further engagement appeared self-evident.
The anti-sanctions campaign
The military planning of the Regional Initiative was interrupted by the Burundian army’s 
1996 coup d’état, which brought former President Pierre Buyoya (1987–1993) back to 
power. In a swift response to the military’s seizure of power, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Zambia issued national declarations of sanctions. The 
Regional Initiative (1996b) demanded the immediate restoration of Burundi’s National 
Assembly, the reinstatement of political parties and Burundian parties’ commitment to 
regionally sponsored negotiations, which later became the single most important condi-
tion in lifting the embargo.
Despite Buyoya’s display of power by unconstitutionally returning to the govern-
ment, the regime reinvented itself as a government resisting regional intervention poli-
tics and particularly Tanzania’s alleged secret agenda of weakening ‘the proud and 
ancient nation of Burundi’ (Nyamoya, 1997). It developed a strategy that incorporated 
sanctions-busting activities to undermine the sanctions’ economic impact (Hoskins et al., 
1997) and questioned the sanctions’ legality, proportionality and effectiveness in promot-
ing peace (Grauvogel, 2015). This argumentation went hand in hand with rejecting the 
Regional Initiative’s interpretation that the July 1996 coup was an unconstitutional 
change of government, which was contrary to the Buyoya government’s contention that 
its seizure of power was necessary to stabilise the country (Zacarias, 1996).
While resisting external interference in the form of sanctions, the Buyoya govern-
ment strengthened its dominance over society and its domestic political adversaries by 
using the shortage of goods and the opaqueness of trade under sanctions to its own 
advantage. The disruption to the economy and the widespread use of sanctions-busting 
tactics facilitated the restoration of clientelist networks and tied key supporters closer to 
the regime, with (former) high-ranking civil servants, local businessmen and even cabi-
net ministers profiting from clandestine trade activities (Daley, 2007; Ngaruko and 
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Nkurunziza, 2000). Moreover, the Buyoya government discredited political opponents 
such as the major (Hutu) opposition party FRODEBU, who welcomed sanctions as a 
means of bringing the parties to the negotiating table (Burundi Büro, 1997), and Hutu 
rebels, who saw them as a chance to weaken Buyoya militarily (interview with J Ndiho, 
former spokesperson of the CNDD-FDD). According to the Buyoya government, these 
forces willingly accepted the population’s suffering to further their own political goals 
(interview with A Girukwigomba, former Minister of Finance and member of UPRONA’s 
executive committee; interview with J Ndayisaba, former Minister of Basic Education 
and Alphabetization).
Embargo against a ‘reactionary’ government
According to some influential members of the Regional Initiative, the coup was a clear 
manifestation of the ‘reactionary’ nature of the Tutsi elite, particularly the army (Nyerere, 
1998), and needed to be resisted. The Tanzanian president justified the regional decision 
to impose sanctions on the putschist government as ‘a declaration of principle that the era 
of coups d’état was over’ (Mkapa, 1996).
In post-colonial Africa, coups were often justified as the only viable means to displace 
authoritarian and corrupt civilian governments (Clark, 2007: 141f.). The legitimisations 
given by the Buyoya government largely conformed to this discourse. In 1996, however, 
such an argument was no longer uncontested. Attempts to re-orient the continental 
organisation had culminated in a fuzzy affirmation of democracy as the aspired political 
order at an OAU heads of state and government summit in 1990, but it was not until 
1997, one year after the Burundian coup, that the OAU explicitly condemned a military 
government for forcefully displacing a democratically elected government (Hartmann, 
2005: 205). Thus, the Burundian coup happened at a time when the institutional and 
normative frameworks of the continent were being renegotiated in a process that was 
later described as a change from ‘non-intervention’ to ‘non-indifference’ (Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, 2005; Mwanasal, 2005; Williams, 2006). In this sense, the Regional 
Initiative was challenging the conventional practice of African states to not comment on 
unconstitutional changes of government and, by imposing sanctions, was demarcating 
itself from Burundi as a ‘regional aberration’ (Nyerere, 1998: 150; cf. also Bliesemann 
de Guevara and Kühn, 2011: 143). Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, who 
likewise campaigned for transforming the continental regime on sovereignty and inter-
vention, has described such a stance as an act of resistance: ‘We must rebel against the 
tyrants and the dictators, those who seek to corrupt our societies and steal the wealth that 
belongs to the people’ (Mbeki, 1998).
Simultaneously, the Regional Initiative’s resistance against such non-intervention 
norms and practices enabled it to consolidate its dominant position in the Burundian 
intervention scene. By enacting sanctions, the Regional Initiative prioritised advancing 
its political goals through economic coercion over the welfare of the Burundians. Less 
obviously, by conditioning the lifting of sanctions, the Regional Initiative claimed that 
only it could ensure a peaceful solution to the Burundian crisis (Regional Initiative, 
1996c), thereby reaffirming its superiority over the Burundian elites (cf. Chandler, 2013: 
17f.). Even when signs of domestic negotiations between the major Burundian parties 
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mounted, the Regional Initiative maintained the view that only regionally led negotia-
tions could bring peace (Regional Initiative, 1998).
The quest for a domestic solution
The Burundian elites questioned the solutions advocated by the Regional Initiative, 
which demanded inclusive and unconditional negotiations between all armed move-
ments and political parties under the facilitation of Nyerere in order to lift the sanctions 
(e.g., Regional Initiative, 1996c, 1998). The Buyoya government rejected the Regional 
Initiative’s insistence on Arusha as the place of negotiations and Nyerere as the chief 
negotiator (Reyntjens, 2000: 18). Instead, Burundian politicians put forth the idea of 
an internal peace process based on coalition-building and consultation, which pre-
cluded any potential attempt to externally approach the Burundian crisis context as an 
‘empty shell’ that could be transformed from afar. Key political elites initiated a 
national debate that brought together representatives of the major parties, members of 
parliament, public officials and civilian groups, yet excluded the armed movements 
(Nsanze, 2003). At the beginning of 1998 this national debate led to the conclusion of 
a partnership agreement between UPRONA and the domestic wing of FRODEBU 
(République du Burundi, 1998).
The government, as well as members of FRODEBU, believed that the conclusion of 
this partnership agreement proved that internal dialogue between Burundians could pos-
sibly mitigate the political and societal antagonisms and, hence, demanded to manage the 
conflict domestically (Buyoya, 2011).6 For that reason, the maintenance of sanctions – 
rather than allowing Burundians to find their own solutions – was rejected as an increas-
ingly counterproductive way to bring about a peace process (Nijimbere, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the Burundian government’s emphasis on finding an internal solution was 
also viewed as a means to retain control over the negotiations. Buyoya was generally 
willing to negotiate (Buyoya, 2011; Manirakiza, 2007), but on his terms (interview with 
L Nijimbere, former military advisor to President Buyoya).
A fuzzy vision of change
By contrast, the Regional Initiative justified the maintenance of sanctions as a way to 
resist a particular vision of order that emphasised stability over change. According to its 
members’ claim, the Regional Initiative was the only force able and willing to facilitate 
a sustainable peace for Burundi that would ensure ‘democracy and security for all’ (e.g., 
Regional Initiative, 1996c, 1998). However, the regional embracing of democracy was 
limited: firstly, the region as a whole lacked a common understanding of democracy. 
Secondly, not every member of the Regional Initiative shared the view that democracy in 
Burundi was desirable. Nevertheless, even the Rwandese and Ugandan governments 
pressed for change over stability; this represented a clear departure from ‘old’ modes of 
African rule (Oloka-Onyango, 2004).
Despite this regional demand for change, Western policy makers largely replicated the 
Buyoya government’s position that the coup was necessary to consolidate the central 
authority (Lemarchand, 1998: 11). A takeover of power by Buyoya appeared to be the 
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lesser of two evils. In many Western capitals, Buyoya still enjoyed the reputation of 
being a moderate, since he had accepted his defeat at the ballot box in 1993 (International 
Crisis Group (ICG), 1998: 48; Zacarias, 1996). Following the international community’s 
renewed engagement with the Buyoya government despite its unconstitutional seizure of 
power, the Regional Initiative concluded that only its facilitation could bring about pro-
found change (Miller, 2011: 61).
This interpretation of events gave way to a broader resistance against the interference 
of the international community. After an initial endorsement of the Regional Initiative’s 
approach towards the new regime (UN, 1996), Western governments soon voiced doubts 
about the embargo’s ability to positively affect the situation in Burundi. By mid-1998, 
the UN, the European Union and the USA all intensified their demands that sanctions 
should be reconsidered (Mthembu-Salter, 1999), but the Regional Initiative questioned 
the international community’s historic dominance in the intervention scene and resisted 
its interference with regional mediation attempts.
The leading members of the Regional Initiative envisioned a division of labour 
according to which the international community would limit itself to providing financial 
support rather than obstructing regionally sponsored change (Mkapa, 1998a). With the 
Western envoys’ ‘tendency to want to dominate and control the process’ (Facilitator’s 
Report of the 1st Session, quoted by Khadiagala, 2003: 234), the proposed division of 
labour failed. Consequently, the Regional Initiative’s insistence on sanctions should be 
comprehended as a means of bringing about change in Burundi ‘without the help of out-
siders’ (Museveni quoted by ICG, 2000: 19) – a representation that itself aimed at legiti-
mising the dominance of African interveners over Western approaches to peacemaking.
The encounter of regional and domestic elites: Delineating 
gaps
The Burundian peace process illustrates the complex political dynamics that evolve 
between domestic elites and regional interveners. The encounters between the Burundian 
elites and the members of the Regional Initiative were not without friction, which we 
conceptualised as intertwined articulations of domination and resistance. The claim to 
resist also served as a means to dismiss the position of the respective other, thereby 
enhancing one’s own legitimacy.
In the previous section, we analysed articulations of resistance in three different tem-
poral moments in which certain topics (namely the regionally led ‘humanitarian’ inter-
vention, the regional sanctions in response to Buyoya’s military takeover and the 
desirable post-conflict order) shaped the debate in the intervention scene. By focusing on 
these articulations of resistance, interpretation gaps between the domestic elites and the 
regional interveners became visible. The domestic elites tended to resist external inter-
ference on the basis of their ‘just’ struggle, their attempt to stabilise the situation and 
their ability to find a domestic solution. In contrast, with regard to the same issues, the 
Regional Initiative feared a ‘second Rwanda’ if the struggle were to continue, resisted 
the ‘reactionary’ backlash of post-coup Burundi, and dismissed the possibility of an 
internal solution to the conflict. These gaps in interpretation in the Burundian peace pro-
cess are an indication of the difficulties faced when crafting a post-conflict vision that is 
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acceptable to both interveners and national elites, not to mention local elites and ordinary 
citizens. In other words, by adhering to certain categorisations, both regional and domes-
tic elites persistently produced ‘zones of erasure and incomprehensibility’, where the 
others’ reading was either invalid or illegible (Tsing, 2005: 195f.). In our take on gaps, 
the latter do not only emerge when universalised knowledge schemes fail to seize local 
complexities (cf. Tsing, 2005; Van der Lijn, 2013). Focusing on the frictional encounters 
between interveners and the intervened upon renders visible how both sides necessarily 
reduce complexity and thereby create gaps of comprehension.
Yet, the domestic elites and regional interveners did not only understand the conflict 
and intervention dynamics in radically different terms, but – in order to justify their 
resistance – also referred to different scales (see Table 1). By rejecting the ‘regional dik-
tat’, the Burundian elite refused to subordinate their national well-being to broader con-
tinental rationalities. In contrast, the regional interveners substantiated their intervention 
politics towards Burundi not so much with respect to the complexities on the ground. 
They primarily saw Burundi as a possibility to reinvent themselves as a region that is 
able to address its ‘own’ problems and enact ‘progressive’ change (Wodrig, 2014).
The intervention in Burundi therefore highlights how different scalar positions are 
hard to reconcile, thereby widening the gaps between different actors in the interven-
tion scene to such an extent that, in the case of Burundi, regional interveners and 
Burundian elites talked past each other. Rather than struggling to define a shared 
understanding of peace, at least in the time period between 1996 and 1999, the regional 
and Burundian elites followed different scalar rationalities (cf. Neumann and Winckler, 
2013: 620) that suggested a certain kind of peacebuilding at odds with the respective 
other vision of peace.
Our analysis of the interactions between regional interveners and local elites sheds 
light on how political, economic and social gaps between the interveners and those inter-
vened upon emerge and deepen in the context of regionally led peacebuilding. Previous 
studies have often focused on disparities that became visible despite the physical pres-
ence of international staff in the crisis context. In the words of Autesserre (2014: 5), the 
latter ‘inhabit a separate world with its own time, space, and economics – and, even more 
Table 1. Gaps of interpretation and gaps of scale.
Gaps of interpretation Gaps of scale
Armed/ 
humanitarian 
intervention
Domestic resistance against interference 
with ‘just’ struggle vs. regional resistance 
against a ‘second Rwanda’
Reference to Burundian 
struggle vs. reference to 
continental tragedy
Sanctions Domestic resistance against sanctions’ 
humanitarian impact vs. regional 
resistance against still dominant 
paradigm of non-interference
Reference to humanitarian 
situation in Burundi vs. 
reference to continental 
norms
Domestic/ 
regional solution
Domestic resistance against regionally 
led peace process vs. regional resistance 
against the international community’s 
prioritisation of stability
Reference to domestic 
solution vs. reference to 
international hierarchies
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importantly, its own system of meaning’. These gaps become manifest through enor-
mous income disparities (Jeldres, 1993: 107; Lemay-Hébert, 2011a: 1833–1836), with 
interveners spending their leisure time at beaches rather than in the backyard with locals 
(Autesserre, 2014: 6f.) and more generally the interveners’ cosmopolitan habitus that is 
often not very sensitive to local viewpoints (Goetze and Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014). 
Such disparities prevent external intervention and external visions of peace and order 
from being accepted locally.
The case of Burundi indicates that gaps do not only emerge when interveners are 
physically present. As in other cases, the gaps in the Burundian intervention scene pre-
vented a real transformation of the state–society nexus. Although the Regional Initiative 
was able to assert its demand for a regionally sponsored peace, the current crisis in 
Burundi – particularly President Pierre Nkurunzizas’ third term and the failed coup 
attempt on 13 May 2015 – suggest that the power-sharing arrangement did not radically 
alter the exercise of governance in Burundi. In addition, the current constellation dis-
plays a comparable gap to the one we just delineated for the past. While those demon-
strating against Nkurunziza consider the current moment as one of democratic awakening, 
the regional interveners – this time being represented by institutionalised bodies such as 
the East African Community and the African Union – primarily fear renewed local and 
potentially regional instability, which they seek to contain through facilitating negotia-
tions in the spirit of Arusha.
Conclusion
Our analysis reveals that the domestic elites and regional interveners accessed very dif-
ferent sites of knowledge – separated by scale – that suggested different lines of action 
for them and thus rendered their encounters frictional. The Burundian elite substantiated 
their critique of the regional intervention by referring to the national scale and its inher-
ent rationalities. A regional military intervention appeared to interfere with what they 
deemed a ‘just’ struggle. With a political debate on the national scale taking off, the 
regional insistence on the facilitation under Nyerere increasingly appeared to be a diktat. 
By contrast, the Regional Initiative primarily referred to sites of knowledge located on 
the regional, continental or even international scale. The intervention was a critique of 
the inaction during the Rwandan genocide and of the continental practice of not com-
menting on unconstitutional changes of government. Based on their self-conception as 
belonging to the ‘new breed of African leaders’, most of the members of the Regional 
Initiative also challenged the international community’s prioritisation of order over pro-
found transformation in Burundi.
We have also shown that the domestic elites and regional interveners articulated their 
actions as resistance in order to secure and strengthen their positions. By impeding a 
humanitarian intervention, for example, UPRONA was able to keep hold of the security 
apparatus. The Regional Initiative, by contrast, developed a paternalistic disposition in 
relation to the crisis context that is often discernible amongst interveners. With the enact-
ment of sanctions and the conditions they attached to their lifting, the regional interven-
ers were able to consolidate their dominance vis-à-vis the Burundian parties as well as 
the so-called international community.
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This analysis reveals the regional and domestic elites’ difficulties to transcend their 
own locatedness. At the beginning of this article, we comprehended this locatedness in 
geographical terms. Now, we are able to specify it. By revealing the different scales of 
resistance and domination, we argue that such locatedness does not simply point to a 
geographical place but, more precisely, to the regional and domestic elites’ embedded-
ness into a discourse, that is, a system of relevance. Both discourses transform through 
the encounter but they do not converge in the course of the intervention.
This lasting gap between the Burundian elite and the Regional Initiative draws a pes-
simistic picture of the possibility of a peace that is acceptable to all the stakeholders 
involved. Authors have suggested that intergovernmental organisations and international 
NGOs involved in peacebuilding tasks should become more responsive to developments 
on the national and local scales (Campbell, 2011; Goetze and Bliesemann de Guevara, 
2014: 801). Our findings, thus, hint at a major avenue for future research. While regional 
interveners often claim to be better equipped than the international community at large 
to manage conflicts, since they have better access to the knowledge of the crisis context 
(Mkapa, 1998b), the case of Burundi suggests otherwise. It is therefore essential that 
future research scrutinises whether such gaps between regional and national sites of 
knowledge have emerged in other instances of regional intervention.
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Notes
1. Against this backdrop, international–regional and international–local dynamics are only 
incorporated into the analysis to the extent that the protagonists of our analysis refer to them.
2. In this article, we understand articulation as utterance, that is, an act of claiming something, 
and not as the act of linking previously detached elements. We would like to thank one of the 
reviewers for alerting us to the different meanings of the term.
3. Our analysis is based on interview data and documents. In Burundi, 34 semi-structured inter-
views with diplomats, policy makers, military personnel and journalists were conducted 
between August and September 2013. Press releases and additional documents were used to 
supplement the analysis whenever still available, but many potentially useful sources were 
lost during the civil war. With respect to the Regional Initiative, the analysis is based on its 
communiqués, speeches and interviews given by heads of states and reports issued by the 
mediation team, as well as national parliamentary debates. In addition, 14 semi-structured 
interviews with current and former policy makers, former diplomats, journalists and scholars 
were conducted in Tanzania between September and December 2011.
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4. For a summary of the debate on whether resistance must be recognised to qualify as resist-
ance, see Hollander and Einwohner (2004).
5. We do not suggest that the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 precluded 
any claims of resistance in the intervention scene. Nonetheless, the constellations changed 
with the peace agreement. For instance, the members of the Regional Initiative increasingly 
considered the remaining armed movements that refused to sign the peace agreement to be 
the main obstacle to peace (Wodrig, 2014: 228–229). This shift in focus enabled new claims 
of resistance to emerge – a constellation that, however, goes beyond the scope of this article.
6. In contrast, the major rebel groups rejected such an internal political solution, pointing to 
horizontal friction between various domestic forces.
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